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I begin teaching Whitman by reading the first line of"Song ofMyself," "I celebrate
myselt: and sing myself." Then I ask who in the class has said that about himself or herself in
the last \veek. r\'1y basic aim is to make the students a\vare that Whitman' s poetry is probably
not expressive in the traditional sense of reporting on feelings. Rather it offers a mode of
desire inseparable from the rhetorical energies that sustain it. There may be a self \ve can
celebrate and sing, but it occupies a somewhat different site from the one \vho negotiates the
practical \vorld. Once this difference is established, I can begin to explore questions about ho\v
\ve learn to enter and to value this \\'hitmanian site ~Iy goal is to convey three claims that link
\Vhitman to modernism (or at least to my version ofmodemism)l: that reading \\bitman
involves imaginative leaps enabling us to treat constructive energy as opening up various
possible experiences \vhich are not usually roles \\"ithin our practical repetoires; that unless \ve
can treat poetry as the exploration of such sites for experience we will never encounter the
kinds of celebrations, and the kinds of selves, it affords at its most eloquent and expansive
moments; and, finally, that unless we can take seriously the proleptic "\ve'" in\"ited by the poem
and required in its discussion, we will not be able even to discuss meaningfully the values that
were most important to \\Thitman and that now can make substantial differences in how \ve
view our own social commitments.
Here I seek to elaborate that "we" in relation to an audience that has much less stake in
indulging the professor than the students do. Yet the concern ·"we" bring for the motifs of
spectacle and nationality affords a context in which this teaching gambit may take on
considerable philosophical and methodological resonance. Getting clear on Whitman's relation
to spectacle (which for me means Foucauldian spectacle) should help us develop a language
for his theatricality, and thinking about the relation between spectacle and nation requires
coming to terms with his dream of serving as the representative man in whom a nation might
become conscious ofwhat is at stake in its world-historical experiment in democratic values.2
2I \vill not foeus on ho\v \\rhitman uses speetaele as an ideologieal tool. Quite the
eontrary. For I think fully appreeiating Whitman's political ambitions for poems like "Song of
Myself' requires understanding how and why Whitman invokes the spaee of speetacle for a
radieally anti-speetaeular projeet. The opening line we have been eonsidering is far too overtly
easual and fluid and quirk)' to introduee either of the interpellative tasks basic to politieal
speetaele. Even \vhen Whitman is at his most theatrieal, he still refuses to invoke any elaborate
symbols and aetual rituals that would serve to stabilize existing authority in order to displaee
other, more Ioeal vehieles for imagining soeial bonds. And while \Vhitman is eertainly
pedagogieal and eager to establish hirnself as an authority, there are obvious grounds for
insisting that this desired authority is not a diseiplinary one nor the means of gaining a hold for
dominant discursive practices. \\.Thitman' s theater is aimed at liberating certain kinds of self-
reflexive pleasures, and his polities depends on modes of eonviction that are only possible
\vhen those pleasures plaee us in tension with established praetiees. (His Lincoln poems are
some\vhat different because they-do foeus on an objeet and hence are sedueed to speetacle by
the inescapable symbolie qualities of the president, but if this suggestion explains ho\v those
poems are exceptions then my basic claims become stronger.)
\lvllitman is distinctive in large part because it is so difficult to define just ho\v to situate
this theatricality. Certainly we cannot simply ally hirn with the t\\"o writerly alternatives that
critics now treat as antidotes to the imposition of po\ver through speetaele -- effons at
documentary realism and projects committed to celebrating the loeal, the marginal, and the
different. Although documentary realism may help free us from the blinders that spectaeles
impose, its commitments to detail and to the observer's stance simply do not allow a self-
reflexive expansiveness suffieient for engaging or shaping potentially publie passions. \Vhitman
wants a writing eapable of fully inhabiting the emotional registers that ean be evoked \vhen \ve
refleet on what the national values ofthe US might involve for an audience, so his art has to
address the ways that the idea of nation
can produce the kinds of meanings for our aetions leading us to saerifice our immediate
interests and even our lives. Conversely, our eontemporary cult of the loeal is so committed to
unsettling these soeial struetures that it reserves for itself preeious little eommon ground on
whieh to base large seale soeial projeets redressing the evils that it exposes. Whitman' s
version of the soeial requires that poetry be able to bring wording and willing so such a
passionate interconnectedness that the work's artieulateness generates, sustains, and justifies
the most intense and capaeious affirmations agents can perform.
3I can begin to specify what this anti-spectacular version of excess involves by turning
to one further aspect ofthe line that opens "Song oflvlyself." David Simpson once observed
that we have to go five hundred lines into the poem before \ve find this opening "I" aftached to
a personal name (at least in 1855 and in editions from 1881 on) ("Destiny lvIade ?vlanifest,"
179). This "I" in other words is not anchored in specific representations or.bound to
particular structures of po\Voer. Specific references to any one person seem far less important
than the range of functions and investments that emerge simply by observoing ho\v the pronoun
gets situated within aspects of the world. Instead of promoting a particular figure of social
power, this purely functional "1" floats freely so that its \vorking can be attached to the self-
reflexive activity ofboth author and readers. There no privileged object, not even a self, that
has to be defended against other particulars or that can be used in the endless social \vork of
justifying exclusion and established po'W·er. For in \\l1itman the socializing force is not a
condition \vith symbolic attributes but a subject \vith po\vers; or, better, the socializing force is
a site of subjecti\Oity that can become a vehicle for self-reflection in a \vide range of social
contexts. The public is essentially a product of a pri\"acy brought into eloquent a\vareness of
its intricacies as it becomes co-e:\.'1ensive \vith the \vorld of objects.
T\venty years ago I could have rested now, content \vith this self-celebrating rhetoric
and free to induIge in cIose reading. But ours are suspicious times, and self-congratuIation is
rarely not \vonh suspecting. In particular any attempt no\v to ally \vith \'/hitmanian vie\\'s of
the subject and his dreams of exemplifying a national mode of consciousness must face t\\"o
very imposing objections. The first objection is theoretical. ..AJ1y synecdochic grounding for
national identity is doubly problematic--in its relying on a single figure that necessarily excludes
the range of differences and agonistic tensions constituting the political fabric, and in its overall
idealizing of the nation as the locus of collective identification. The second objection then
adapts this theoretical perspective to the specific evaluation of Whitman by insisting on
important limitations fundamental to his way of seeking representativeness. For he projects as
collective what is in fact a single white male perspective, and the projection relies on abstract
impersonality insensitive to the temporal and spatial aspects of those contingent loyalties that
are in fact fundamental to full subjectivity.
Let me speIl out both charges then take up each in turn, since they create a climate in
which Whitman's imaginative ambitions now seem to most critics Ettle more than naive
idealism or self-serving obtuseness. Benedict Anderson's /nlagil1ed C0/11nlUl1ities constructed
a framework within which the full apparatus of poststructural critique could eventually be
exercised on the concept of national identity.. He points out that human beings have to find
means of linking "fraternity, power, and time meaningfully together" in the largest practicable
units (anth 89). And probably there has to be some way of supplementing the purely
instrunlental workings of the "state" by some set of imaginary structures that afford agents
various kinds of meanings allowing them to make emotional investments in public life. But
\vhy has the concept of "nation" become the priveleged bearer of these potentials for meaning?
And why has spectacle been so cental vehicle in sustaining the power and authority of these
nation-constructs.? Addressing these questions requires dense historical analysis. But the very
form of Anderson' s questions also invites from questioners the constructivist mentality
elaborated by poststructual theory. Rather than attempt to flesh out the reasons agents gave
for such beliefs we have to understand what forces made such representations of collecti'vity
seem appealing, and \ve have to analyze the instability both caused by and concealed by the
particular representational forms.
?\1ore important, focussing on this instability and on the disciplinary, reductive po\ver of
the basic representations sustaining the idea of a nation requires the analyst to be suspicious of
most forms of fealty that the nation seeks trom its citizens. Once there is so pronounced a gap
between the claim about collective identity and the multiple interests and orientations
suppressed or shaped by the generalizing claim, it is difficult not to treat "nation" itself as both
substitute and supplement. "Nation" stands in for a range of particulars that it negates or at
best sublates, and it produces an additional set of concerns \vhich often blind us to those more
intimate, less displaced interests. So criticism seems to have no alternative but to seek \vays of
exposing the interests and structures of po\ver put in place by these dominant modes of
imagining, and then seeking to release the force of the differences repressed by that
domination.
This task requires seeking some place of utterance not bound to the fictions of
nationhood. For two decades, Frederic Buell points out, \ve developed these alternative
places by cultivating notions of ethnicity and class which afforded identities not representable
within the discourse of the nation. But now we have to face the fact that these assertions of
identity raise the same problems of representativeness and suppression on other levels, so we
are forced to enter a deconst~ctive phase suspicious of all substantial imaginary identifications
(Natiol1al Culture al1d tl1e New Global System, 177). The ideal citizen becomes inseparable
from the ideal critic who can occupy borderlines or margins where there is sufficient traffic
among the competing discourses that the possibilities for new political configurations can be
cultivated simply within a shared labor of constant translation. For this task our imagined
5"horne" has to be not \vithin thepublic discourse of the nation but \vithin \vhat Homi Bhabha
calls the "meanwhile" that every national narrati\re has to deny in order to establish both its
singular sto1)' and its voices authorized to continue that story. Critics then can enter the nation
at those points \vhere the dominant culture sees only the lack of meaning, but also where there
emerge perspectives from which its own dominance seerns tenuous and unstable (Natioll alld
Narratioll, 297, 313).
In this conceptual atmosphere spectacles endorsed by the nation are not going to
command much respect. The more visible the disciplinary work they are asked to do, the more
vital the need to deconstruct them. Perhaps the most forceful statement of this ideology takes
place in Lauren Berleant on Hawthorne's 771e Scarlet Letter:
Collective identity is equivalent to collective amnesia: patriotism is constituted by the
desire to o\·ercome political and historical memory. ... This is \vhy legal spectacle in the
novel is accompanied by references, literal and figurative, to birth and rebinh, for these
signal the state's need to sever the relation bet\veen persons and their memories. The
threatening aspect of personal memory, \\"hich I have
called counter-memory, is that it reveals both that the state is not inevitable and
it is also at times irrelevant to the needs, desires, practices, and identities of
citizens ("The .AJ1atomy ofNational Fantasy", 199-200).
The most influential recent \\'hitman criticism flies the same flag. David Simpsen, fer
example, argues that the ambition for inclusiveness fundamental to \\11itman' s quest to be the
national poet in fact leads hirn to avoid any "fruitful recognition of differences" ("Destiny
J\1ade J\1anifest," 177). \V'hitman certainly ackno\vledges slavery and poverty, but he is so
eager to inhabit every possible social position and disposition that he refuses to ackno\vledge
those features of these states \vhich might resist his capacity to understand and to represent
them:
Whitman's occupations--traders, mechanics, farmers, and so forth--never interact 1l'itJ1
each other or confront each other. The poetry presents them within a chain of
successive signifiers, Ilext to each other but never interfering or challenging each
other (182).
Thus even on the level of syntax Whitman ignores grammatical subordination, relies on
copulatives that place power in the language rather than in agency, and prefers the
inclusiveness of metonymy to the indefiniteness of metaphor (190-91).
Why is this omnivorous so debilitating? At one pole the "capacity to remain totally
unaware of any difference between self and other marks hirn out as the voice of manifest
6destiny" (192). At the other it reveals hirn as less "a\vare" than writers like Cooper and Irving
." of the degree to \vhich the national identity seems likely to consist in an uneasy collection of
factions, each competing \vith the others for recognition and for basic rights" (183). There
seem only t\VO options--either "\ve read Leaves as an account ofthe state of affairs or as an
ideal prognosis" (186). And although "the poet hirnself is hardly clear on this question" (186),
neither path \vill afford hirn substantial status as anything other than a maker of"the songs of
individual selves" (195). Whitman' s \vork is failed spectacle.
Wai Chee Dimock's Residues 01Justice otters a brilliant analysis ofthis failure by
providing a more concrete and intricate account ofwhat is problematic in \Vhitmanian
universalizing. Adapting communitarian critiques of Kantian theories ofjustice and obligation,
she argues quite convincingly that there are important paralleIs between \\!'hitman and Kant,
since they both repress contingency in order to be able to celebrate the universalizing po\vers
on \vhich the morallife can be estabIished. As \\'e see most clearly in accounts ofjustice, the
appropriate uni\'ersalizing requi[~s developing some comrnon scale that enables one condition
to pay for or compensate for another of quite a different kind. But establishing this
con1mensurability puts at risk the actual ~'densities and textures of human lives" (9).
Conversely, literature can provide a domain of the incommensurate because it seeks to
foreground the contingent and the singular. But not in \\ihitman. \Vhitman' s subject is the
subject praised by theories ofjustice because it allo\vs no contingency, instead assuming that it
can produce out of itself equivalents for everything it encounters. \Vhitman brings impaniality
to the very core of \vhat for others is the intimate affective site for partial personal affections.
Hence his poetry translates "seriality into simultaneity" (11 7), so that "nothing is contingently
compelling~' (118): "it captures for us the openness of space but not the endurance of time, the
rhythms of fresh beginnings but not the music of familiar affections, the rene\vability of syntax
but not the sedimentation of meanings" (120). Whitman' 5 is a democratic stance in form only,
with an irnpoverished sense of\vhat might constitute the differences that must negotiate his
nation's public spheres.3
Because my concern is primarily with how we develop languages ofvalue for talking
about Whitman and his heirs, I have to take on these conceptual frameworks directly. First I
will try to show that there is a rationale by which it may still make sense to seek and idealize
cogent \vays of speaking about the U. S. as a nation. Then I will argue that seeking
representativeness in relation to that nation is a plausible poetic project, at least when it is
7pursued by the distinctive and inteIlectually sophisticated mode of representativeness that
Whitman exemplifies.
Defending the idealizing of national identity need not entail jingoism or even the
monstrous activating of differences that poststructural theory leads us to project. It is true that
for there to be a "we" there must be a "not us," and casting a light in one place throws
shadows elsewhere. And it is true there must be some active principle of differentiation that
reinforces for culture what borders do for material space.4 But the differentiations need not
involve the kinds ofbeliefs that equate difference yvith hostility or with inferiority. In principle
at least, the difference can be treated primarily as some contingent historical feature that has
led nations to develop habits and structures distinguishing them from other units and
intensifying specific loyalties justified largely by the contingent fact that one was brought up in
these traditions and wants to see them fully expressed. pne can imagine states functioning as
national troops do sometimes under UN commands: some differences have to acknowledged
and seen as important, others can be suppressed, but the agents are careful to prevent any one
difference from becoming the basis for principled aggression.
This benign view of cultivating national identites becomes much more feasible ifwe can
postulate national fealties not based on the mediation of spectacles, since spectacles do tend to
codify power by sustaining particular leaders and by giving extraordinary imaginative vitality to
metonyms like flags that easily become totalized and abstracted. Anti-spectacular nationalism
allo\vs at least two substantial defenses for making identificat~ons on the level ofthe nation.
The first defense concentrates on the forms of responsibility to other persons that such
identifications make possible, while the second emphasizes those \vays that identifying with
the nation affords significant ways pursuing selves we can become.
I think the primary social reason we need concepts of a nation is that no other social
unit can take the kinds of responsibilities that enable us to address the needs and sufferings of
large classes of people who would slip through any more communitarian version of a welfare
net. Having the nation enables us both to show why everyone has claims on the state and to
establish the authority to demand the sacrifices necessary to foster that welfare. Dur culture
tends to find sentimental Ernest Renan's important observation that "a nation is a grand
solidarity constituted by the sentiment of sacrifices which one has made and those that one is
disposed to make again" (uQu'est-ce que une nation," 17). For us Renan seems little more
than an apologist for universal military service. And his view of sacrifice requires an abstract
sense of duty that we distrust: for us what matters is the possibility that concrete relations with
others will make us want to help in ways that do not generate the resentment that enforced
8sacrifice does~' But it may be the case that there is no feasible alternative to such resentment.
We simply have to see that the good of the nation demanding sacrifice outweighs the
psychological dispositions that the demand may cause. And ifwe understand the grounds of
the appeal to sacrifice we may be able to minimize such resentment.
The grounds that sanction calling for sacrifice are inseparable from the possibilities for
.justice that the liberal state takes as its basic imperative. For that state can only pursue equality
of opportunity and the fostering of conditions conducive to good lives for its citizens if it can
make substantial demands on its population that apply on a scale more general than any ofthe
. specific values honored by particular communities within the state.
Consider the justification for tax laws or laws about civil rights. And, more important,
consider the fact that even when one stresses as Dimock does those incommensurables that
justice cannot address, there may be no way to get a society to honor the relevant differences
unless we can sustain the senses of obligation produced by identifying v-1th a nation.
The crucial consideration here is the need to develop emotional conditions and practical
--- ..
structures leading apopulace to accept responsibilities towards those \\t;th whom they have no
personal ties. The nation is a concept attempting to give a human solidarity to historically
contingent multi-cultural groups by allowing the other as other to still have claims on social
resources. More concretely, the nation is a construct that makes it possible to treat anyone' s
suffering Vlithin its boundaries as something to be feIt and responded to by all. Smaller units
like families and tribes might address that suffering, but they need not because there is no
. specific connection to those who are neighbors but do not possess the relevant attributes for
belonging to the group. Larger units like UN commissions have the same·responsibility but the
need r~rely reaches anyone's imagination or sense of obligation (unless there are immense
spectacles). When suffering is registered on a global scale it is all too easy to feel very little
hope and even less responsibility. Famine in Ethiopa is a matter for charity; extreme poverty in
Apalachia is plausibly a matter for national policy, and hence for treating it as normal to expect
sacrifi~es on an institutional scale because ofresponsibilities that are simply part ofwhat it
meanS to be a citizen of this nation.
The second defense of investing in the concept of "nation" takes the opposite path.
Here the crucial concern is not with the needs of the other but with the possible modes of self-
consciousness afforded in"dividual citizens. The most obvious and most powerfuI reason for
caring about nations, at least for caring about democratic and pluralist nations like the US, is
the kind of meaning the nation affords for pursuing particular identities that are not available
within more narrow tribai or ethnic frameworks. Clearly identifying with the nation is not
9appropriate for most aspects of our lives--imagine marrying someone because he or she served
the nation in important ways. But to conceive alI our possible identities along these intimate
lines may be too narrow a view ofwhat persons are and are likely to enjoy.s There are in
addition a range of specific identities defined by roles we play for the nation, like soldier or
voter, and there are a range of imaginary projections that affect our senses of ourselves. In
the dominant intellectual climate we rarely notice that the language of contingency actually
helps establish what is important in those roles of soldier, voter, tax-payer, etc. For these roles
require our acknowledging and taking responsibility for those aspects of our social embedding
which provide us material resources and provide 'practical foundations for social life. Levinas
provides an interesting analogue in his rendering of interpersonal situations, within which we
makes us see how i'rreducibly dependent the "I" is on forces enabling it to take certain stances:
there is no "I" without a "you" that situates it, and no self-consciousness without an intricate
set of expectations and projections in relation to the other. In the political sphere these
dependencies are even more imposing, since they range trom material resources providing
security and mobility to educationaI resources alIo\\:·ing us the frameworks within which we
experience our ·values. Yet we rarely acknowledge our dependency on them or make that
dependency itself a reason for actions and passionso Playing public roles is one small way that
we can not only make those acknowledgements but also take responsibility for those
dimension of our lives that we do not shape or control but do rely on. Such role-playing
produces a theater in which citizens can come to appreciate what they hold in common in
relation to contingent differences. 6
Were this the only set of identifications made possible by the nation, honoring that
dimension of our lives would be essentially a matter of repaying debts, with little room for
creativity. That is why I hasten to add a second model for these identifications which allows a
much wider range of possibilities and a much more substantial theater for establishing
distinctive personal qualities. Here my source is not the lugubrious Levinas but the illustrious
Whitmanian philosopher Alan Ginsberg? His poem"America" begins with an extended
personal complaint about America's failures. In order to contextualize this, the poem has to
turn back on itself: attempting to figure out why the poet refuses to give up his obsession with
his country. Why does he feel compelled both to rebel and to announce his rebellion to his
country with the same expectation of loving chastisement that one often has toward parents?
Ironically as the process of address grows even more self-conscious, the poet's identification







again." And then he needs a way of simultaneously accep~ing that large claim and escaping
entrapment within the restricted range of imaginary lives that the country fosters in its people:
America how can I write a holy litany in your silly mood?
I will continue like Henry Ford my strophes are as individual as his auto-
mobiles more so they're all different sexes.
America 1will seIl you strophes $2,500 a piece $500 down on your old
strophe
America free Tom Mooney ...
America this is quite serious.
America this is the impression I get from Iooking in the television set.
America is this correct?
T' d better get right down to the job.
1t's true I don't want to join the army or turn lathes into precision parts
factories, I'm_E.e~rsighted and psychopathie anyway.
America l'm putting my queer shoulder to the wheel. (Collected Poems, 146-8)
There is no doubt that Ginsberg feels wounded by the very nation that he wants to celebrate.
But that is the aspect of contingency that he has to reconcile with the possibility of
acknowledging the forees that have formed hirn. In fact his sense ofbetrayal proves inseparable
from ideals cultivated by that very nation, so he as to realize that even his pain is part of his
identifying with his nation. Pehaps the greater the sense of pathos, the greater the desire to
speak for the US, even to become America.7
One could elaborate that thesis politieally by arguing that perhaps only by keeping the
American dream alive can one effectively involve large publics in direct labors of resistance to
the US' s failures to live up those dreams. Or one could just observe how this poem comes to
enact a complex identity as self-reflexively American poet seeking a partieular way of
responding to those failures. Putting his queer shoulder to the wheel marvelously insists at
once on his wounds, on his difference trom the mainstream, on his eontinuing faith that there
remains a larger level of identifieations where treating oneself as actively bound to the eountry
is neeessary if one is to feel fully one' s powers as an individual, and on the public role of poetry
in aeeomplishing aIl those tasks because it ean so quickly bring together diverse levels of
identifieation while demonstrating investment in specific identifications. This poem earns a
right to the poet's strangeness by its ironie straightforwardness in aceepting anational identity.
And by aecepting that identity it manages to revive the very idea that there eould be a plausible
dream ofwriting as if there were a nation to address. 8
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Making the same case for Whitma~ is more difficult because his ironies are not so
foregrounded and hence his identification with the nation not so intricately balanced, or
hedged. ~ut his critics will come to our aide For ifwe can respond to such sharp criticisms,
we can bring out the depth and complexity ofWhitman's efforts to make poetry the basis for
elaborating a public identity on anti-spectacle grounds. And we can show how that poetry
directly addresses both aspects of nationhood for which I have been arguing--the need to go
beyond communitarian versions of what constitutes the collective and the opportunity to
explore possible identifications through one's understanding ofthe nation that offer distinctive
and poweful senses ofwho the self can become.
In order to develop this case I need first to propose a rough distinction I am not quite
sure how to make. \Ve have to have terms for two different kinds of identifications--those that
we take on simply as means of investing our lives \\;th imaginary values and those that we
consciously manipulate as heuristic instruments or projections enabling us to develop or ex1end
certain powers or situations. Clearly most particular acts of identification will involve both
poles, but there remain substantially different consequences when it seems plausible to
emphasize one over the other. Let me call the first mode of identification imaginary, since it
depends on the internal spectacle fundamental to Lacanian analysis. A person comes to
identify with a particular image because ofthe relation which this image establishes with some
third party whose fantasized desire it mediates and secureso Dimock's \\rhitman can sente as
aOn example because in her story he is soseduced by the dream of public identity, of a public
willing to take him as a representative, that he becomes dependent on that one image and loses
sight of all the contingent personal dimensions needed to bind such speculation to the actual
worldo But there is also a Whitman whom we might prefer to consider as dealing with
imaginative rather than imaginary modes of identification. This Whitman is not content with
the specular qualities that his projections bring into play. Imaginative identification is
something understood as a potential for work and for responsibility, as we saw in Ginsberg's
vision of hirnself as an American. In such cases emphasis is placed on the self-reflexive
framework within which the agent can interpret his or her relation to the image and stage a
specific purposive application ofthe imaginary situation. It then becomes possible for the
agent to pursue modes of satisfaction not limited to the approval specularly grounded in the
imagined desi~e of these third persons. Satisfaction can also take the form of representing
actions as worthy of approval because ofthe specific qualities that the agent exhibits in
12
performing and interpreting the actions--that is how one puts one's queer shoulder to the
wheel.
This distinction between imaginary and imaginative correlates with the distinction
suggested before between the weight that spectacle puts on the object giving a shape to desire
and the weight that anti-spectacle puts on the subject seeking to make articulate its relation to
the desires manifest in its projections. Now I want to put these distinctions to work in order to
gain some distance for Whitman !Tom the two criticisms that I summarized. Consider first the
two options that Simpson posits for Whitman--either he must be read as providing an account
ofhis historical situation or me must offer an ideal prognosis ofhow to transform that
situation. Both of these options insist that what matters in poetry is its capacity to look
outward and either to come to terms with history or to provide alternative paths through a
present morass. But Whitman's focus seems to me much more on states that the subject can
occupy. He does not want to take some ideological position that \\111 be justified by those
whose vie\vs it reflects (who then can provide arefleetion ofhim). Rather he wants to
--- -
articulate a relation to the self that may clarify for an audience how it can find a common sense
of national purpose precisely by looking at what is involved in the intense attachments by
which its differences become manifest. \Vhitman's concern is simply not primarily in
interpreting history or in developing practical alternatives but in how an audience can come to
imagine what is at stake in the very conditions by which history is made and judged.
Dimock helps me make this claim somewhat less abstract and general because she
could be said to accept the case I have just been making, only to show that Whitman' s problem
resides in his idea of how subjects take up these stakes. In her account Whitman can develop
this formal subject so clearly because for hirn there is nothing else to the political subject: all
possibilities remain open because no specific contingent ties shape the subject's sense of
himself And certainly she is right that Whitman is not interested in empirical differences among
contingent subjects. But to insist that Whitman is problematic because he does not represent
such states of subjective investment is to fall into a realism not substantially different from
Simpson's. Perhaps a poetic rendering ofthe ideal of American citizenship requires exploring
another level of subjective life. Perhaps rather than worrying only about the facts of
contingency we also need to imagine what these various subjects might have in common as
they pursue those contingencies. Perhaps if one can break through the specular images binding
us to those contingencies, one can articulate shareable psychological structures by which we
each pursue our different investments? Indeed if we cannot find a level of self-reflection where
we discover something that we have in common because of how we care about different
~
. ~ _.. t
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contingent relations, there is little possibility that we can have any emotional bonds at all to
those whose specific contingencies do not match our own. Without trus common relation ,to
difference we can have astate but not a nation, and we can have laws but not a shareable
investment in why we might honor those laws and supplement their lacks. We can have
agonistic politics, but not even the possibility of any deep level of consensus about how we
engage in those agons.
Let me now try to speIl out what is distinctive about the level of imaginative activity
that Whitman seeks through rus "omnivorous" and omnipresent "1." First I think we have to
grant rum the fundamental perfectionist dualism that is the precondition for his grand monistic
fantasies:
I believe in you my soul, the other I am must not abase .itself to you,
And you must not be abased to the other." ("Song ofMyselt:" sect 5).9
For here \ve see the need in his poetry to engage two basic structures of identification. One
requires aligning the contingent historical agent who addresses the soul with the powers that
the soul seems capable of exercising; the other involves exploring how this sense of active soul
can be used to forge bonds Vvith other people in ways that enable them to reach beyond their
immediate empirical interests as historical agents. To keep these structures of identification
visible Whitman has to build into his own work simultaneous movements into that history and
beyond the history to what Marianne Moore called "ecstatic occasions," those sites where the
pressures of history can be bracketed sufficiently to allow historicaI agents to enter those
radical modes of awareness worthy of being called a soul. 10 In Whitman, as in Moore and in
Crane and in W.C. Williams, these occasions do not so much give access to distinctive worlds
as to distinctive powers in relation to a common historical setting--hence the importance of a
dualist model for access to these powers: one can remain absorbed within the Iocal. while
maintaining a mode of engagement that applies as weIl to other Iocales.
Whitman's fascination with the "l"-"you" structure sterns in part from this dualism.
For this focus enables him to constantly track the ways that the "1" comes to reach beyond
itself because of the modes of intensity allowing it to experience its own powers. At the core
of this structure, then, is a need to deny the gathering powers that spectacle offers because if
when it generates something like ecstasy spectacle threatens to consume self-consciousness
within whatever forces the scene mediates. The following passage from "Song ofMyseIf'







Do you take it I would astomsh?
Does the daylight astomsh? does the early redstart twittering
through the woods?
Do 1 astomsh more than they?
This hour I tell things in confidence,
1 might not tell everybody but 1will tell you. ("Song ofMyself' Sec 19)
At first all the lyric energy goes towards domesticating astomshment so that modifications in
audience awareness derive entirely from nature rather than from any theatrical production.
Then Whitman immediately builds on this naturalizing.. Telling things in confidence seems
initially no different trom the redstart' s "twittering." But without denying this similarity
Whitman also expands it into another register. The poet can build that twittering into a
semantic world secured as a nature by the offering of confidences. Ironically it is precisely
because this utterance is so naturalized, so much part of a common world, that it can also bear
a change in levels of awareness within which persons take on a sense of common intimacies
possibly beyond what ideology imposes upon them. Intimate confidence is continuous \\';th
trus twittering but also a raising of it to another level.
Trus passage is not content merely to refer to this other level. It litera1ly provides the
attentive reader the self-reflexive experience of shifting levels of awareness in \vays that
deepen their sense of what can constitute social bonds. On one level it is simply a joke to say in
an impersonal mode like a \\!ritten poem that "1 might not tell everybody but I will tell you."
The line plays on the fact that "you" is a shifter indistinguishable in its singular and plural
forms. But the line also offers a telling illustration of how confidences can build relations. For
although his sharing a confidence does not astonish, it does completely alter a world, as
daylight does. The one who can register the confidence, the "you' who can first see the joke
then grasp its deeper implications, comes to occupy a distinctive plane where fusions between
the pronoun positions seem toestablish something like Moore' ecstatic occasion. Spectacle is
negated in order to establish an intimacy that depends on linking what is said to how one leams
to listen.
The next section ofthe poem expands this moment ofintimacy. At first the questioning
modulates into documentary concems, but that soon gives way to abstract self-reflection
ascribing social roles to the bonding that the poem thinks it has accomplished:
Who goes there? Hankering, gross, mystical, nude;
How is it I extract strength from the beef I eat?
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What is a man anyhow? What am I? What are you?
All I mark as my own your shall offset it with your own,
Else it were time lost listening to me.
Whitman moves very quiekly from the body to the individual to the generic question "what is a
man" to more eoncrete questions where one ean at least begin to address the issue ofwhat a
man iso Joining the "I" and the "you" defines being a man in terms of complex relations
between independence and self-reflexive interdep~ndence. Whatever the poet proposes, the
audienee must "find out for yourself' whether there is any value in what "I" might perform
(sect 46). But such assertions are themselves also acts of sympathy on the part of the "I,"
since the very act ofunderstanding the audience's need for independence binds the author to
that audience. And the possible allusion to Franklin's obsession with practical uses oftime
extends that sympathy into aspects of what might be anational character.
The one precondition for such bonds is that the agents be able simultaneously to
register their empirical situation and to bracket their characteristic ways of dealing with such
situations. Whitman's poems are not occasions for testing objecti\!e descriptions or carrying on
standard social commerce. Nor are they occasions ofFoucauldian spectacle, since the theatrics
involved are primarily self-reflexive rather than embodied in a compelling surrogate action or
object. However one takes spectacle, its antithesis has to be a dialogical process in which
stressing diffferences provides the fundamental vehicle by which to locate what can be
characterized as soul. Here this process requires bracketing identifications with specific images
so that one can appreciate what is involved in one's participation within a complex set of
functions pulling at once in two directions--further into the listening and further out to seek
how that moment of sameness can be fullfilled in the assertion of differences.
Onee the complexity of identifications iso established, we ean proeeed to the most
important aspects of Whitmanian poetic citizenship. Identification opens onto community
because it locates a shareable "soul" in the very modes of investment by whieh we engage
ourselves in different, often incompatible specific life paths. But simply recognizing the
possibility of such identifications is not suffieient. Whitman wants to make the recognition the
basis for a shared intensity ofwilling that very strueture of eommon interests. T0 aeeomplish
that he has to capture what seems most intimate in our attaehments to the world, then extend





poet's eloquence. Poems become the soul's body, and soul as Whitman understands it cann~t
exist except as self-celebration, since the soul simply is imaginative activity aware of its own
capacity to intensify the moment. Then because the activity is shared in the process of reading,
the poem becomes not just a recognition of commonness in difference but a willing in
difference ofthat commonness:
I teach straying from me, yet who can stray from me?
I follow you whoever you are from the present hour,
My words itch at your ears until you understand them.
I do not say these things for a dollar or to fill up the time while I
'wait for aboat,
(It is you talking just as much as myselt: I act as the tongue ofyou,
Tied in your mouth, in mine it begins to be Ioosen'd. (Sec 47)
Body becomes the locus of that commonness, but a body so inhabited that it comes to
self-reflexive appreciation of its capacities to care about its actions. Therefore Whitman can
claim a sense ofecstasy is closely linked to the most intimate aspects of self-consciousness.
Here the ecstatic occasion takes place as a process of moving from a range of questions tied to
the concrete world into a moment where answering becomes possible--not because some truth
emerges but because a particular charged condition of speaking seerns to satisfy the soul' s in
its expansive reach.
Such ecstatic moments have their dark side. Whitman cannot but idealize death
because imagining it affords the most intense conditions within which we can combine the
totally singular, a person's unshareable concern for one's own particular death, and the
inescapably universal, the fact that each ofus in our different ways perhaps must share that
structure of concern in order to be human. So the world of the sleepers has to haunt
Whitman's imagination, threatening his activism with the seductivefrisson ofyielding to what
we might call an anti-dialectical mode of ecstatic consciousness. Yet once we characterize the
problem we can also come to appreciate how Whitman manages to grant this impulse without
yielding entirely to it. And appreciating that prepar~s us to'understand how Whitman goes
about refusing to let even his demand for affirmation thicken into the spectacular. His poetry
grants no complete resting places, ·not even for identifications with death. Rather he turns
what we have been calling the dialogical aspect of his work into a form of internaI dialectic
within which various encompassing attitudes are explored and modified.
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This dialectic is not Hegelian. But it certainly has enough shifting of perspectives and
moments of complex gathering to make it clear why it is not sufficient to rest with the
emphasis on syncretism and sim'ultaneity that governs Dimock's and Simpson's accounts ofhis
work. Certainly there is a great deal of the syncretic in Whitman. However while pure
simultaneity seems an ideal condition of presence, it is also a seduction into the more enduring
simultaneity of the grave. So we find Whitman constantly shifting the levels of investment and
scope within his work by calling attention to how one might assume and modify overall stances'
towards the syncretic details. This stance towards stances cannot see itself as part of a specific
teleological progression. Rather it consists in a constant adjustment and modification and
expansion or compression of two basic forces. One emerges in the perfectionist tension
between the practical desires of the empirical self and its capacity to feel itself as soul, the
other force sustains the competing pulls independence and interdependence that \\tee have been
tracing. Each set of forces easily solidifies. A person's empirical situation can easily become a
some\vhat narrow source of projections on to the "you," or the imagined "you" can either
become too insistent on what makes it different or it can coIIapse too easily into the versions of
shared identity that the poet offers. No one position is "right." The important concern is that
poetry be sufficiently mobile and intimate to track this movement in ways that keep author and
readers a\\'are of the varieties of intensity and of connection as they emerge--not just for their
own sake but also because the basis for overall identifications as citizens of a democracy 15
precisely one' s awareness of sharing such fluidity.
For a briefexample ofthis dialectic at work consider Whitman's "We Two, How Long
We \Vere Fooled." The poem begins with "we" recognizing that they had been fooled for a
long time. \Vhitman does not tell us why they were fooled, 1t does not matter. At stake is not
particular beliefs but the condition ofthe believers and the possibility now ofmaking
investments in this "we," with the permissions that it confers. On discovering that they have
been fooled, "we, two" first return to nature, not to any one specific form but to nature's
multiplicity. There a host of identifications become available, beautifully balanced in terms of
the kinds of actions that the identifications allow and ofthe varying perspectives that the spirit
gets to occupy:
\Ve are oaks, we grow in openings side by side,
We browse, we are two among the wild herds spontaneous as any,
We prowl fang' d and four-footed in the woods, we spring on prey,
We are two clouds forenoons and afternoons driving overhead,





We are whatthe atmosphere is, transparent, receptive, pervious, impervious, (108)
As details proliferate a remarkable effect begins to take hold, one that calls attention to the
transformative powers of pure attention. These details do not become symbolic, but their
entire sequence comes to seem no longer simply something objective, over against the
perceiving mind. Everything seems charged with metaphoric implications precisely because the
mind can so totally identify with what it engages as it moves. This effect is most obvious in the
celebration ofinterwetting because ofthe obvious sexual overtones. But the quasi-
metaphoricity or literalness suffused with metaphoricity is most resonant in the last line's literal
identification vvith the atmosphere. For here the poems seem both to name and to include the
sense of inclusiveness that also characterizes its feeling for the freedorn it experiences. We are
what the atmosphere is because we are lucid mediators ofwhat is there to be seen, and we are
the atmosphere because our activity literally contains within a composing care eveI)thing that
it registers.
The concluding lines then make one further leap beyond spectacle as the poem tries to
name the effect of feeling itself as this atmosphere, and hence as it gives this "we" an
astonishingly concrete abstract substance:
Wehave circled and circled till we have arrived horne again, we t\VO
We have voided all but freedorn and aIl but our ovmjoy.
Discovering that "we" have been fooled did not result in finding some straight line by which to
pr.oceed. Rather it meant altering the attitude taken in relation to multiplicity and change. By
accepting circling, by yielding to impulse but maintaining full attention to detail and to the
effects of detail, the "we" intensify their bond. In fact they seern to take on a new mode of
existence because trus state rnakes it possible not merely to appreciate what joy is but to feel
oneself identified with something like its abstract purity as an emotion. There is no teleology
here, but there is a remarkable building of substance out of spirit so that spirit can relocate
itself within a wordable world that retains its physicality as entirely compatible with freedorn.
But what has all this spectacular anti-spectacle to do with nation? For Whitman ifit
has something to do with freedorn it has something to do with the USo More specifically, to be
an American rneant for Whitman having access to a poetics in which it did not suffice for the
personal to be political; rather it was to realize how the political was justified in the depths of
the personal. The poet's "I" freed to its greatest possible expansiveness by its imagination of its
country becornes a living concrete emblem for social relations that can not only rnake
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democracy work but also allow it a form that can be celebrated and hence given emotional
resonance for a population. Preserving trus democracy (and hence celebrating trus democracy
because there is no basic difference between the acts of preserving and of celebration) then
requires developing two basic self-reflexive powers for its agents--a capacity to understand in
one's own experience what makes one identical to those pursuing quite different ends, and a
capacity to be sufficiently attentive to those differences to treasure the conditions that make
them possible. The first power is primarily epistemic: it depends on how we direct our
attention and draw conclusions. The second is primarily affective: it depends on those
differences being able to so occupy our will that w~ fully align ourselves with the overall
national identity necessary to preserve and promulgate them.
Iv1y own stage is now set for engaging \\1litman's "Crossing Brooklyn Ferry." While
this poem does not explicity proclaim his ambition to be the national poet, it does offer
\Vhitman' s most fully dialectical performance of the self-reflexive processes that for hirn are
fundamental to cultivating democratic social sensibilities. Engaging this dialectic demands a
some\vhat tedious close-reading of the text' s tv;ists and turns. But I will try to simplify the
process by assuming that the reader Vvill consult a text of the poem, so I can simply focus on
the specific passages necessary for my analysis.
"Crossing Brooklyn Ferry" begins with faces and ends· with souls. At first the faces are
figurative, as the tide, then the sun rising over the commute, take on a human form, only to
yield then to actuaI human presences. By the poem's conclusion, the specificity ofthe sun
gives way to a pervasive summer warmth making the entire harbor seem to participate in one
overall perfection, with each relation furnishing its "parts toward the soul" (165). Similarly the
poem moves from an intricate shifting between space and time, this crowd and crowds in the
future, to an expansiveness that seems to contain both time and space within it: all particulars
serve as anchors for the qualities of soul that emerge as the poet reflects on how the range of
identifications involved modifies his understanding of that soul.
Initially the relevant details all depend on a specifically situated point ofview. By the
second section the poet begins the work of identification that will get hirn to appreciate the
structures fundamental to any point of view capable of processing the same intensities.
Because all the travelers seem to be pla·ying out a drama that extends beyond their particular
moment in time, he finds it possible to develop astrange intimacy with the parts they play.
These people are not simply travelers; they are embodiments ofwhat this particular journey
will continue to make available. That realization then creates a sense ofbeing so anchored in
I
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time that the poet can enter a third section where he can drop the stance ofviewer in order to
explore more intimate lines of connection. Now the "I" begins to use its own subjectivity as
the means foi moving from what people see to an identification with how that seeing modifies
their sense ofthemselves:
1t avails not, time nor place--distance avails not,
I am with you, you men and women of a generation, or ever so
many generations hence,
Just as you feel when you look on the river and sky, so 1 feIt
Just as any one of you is one of a living crowd, I was one of a crowd, ... (160)
And now Whitman can repeat the litany from section 2, but from the point of view not of
someone watching the scene but of someone entering an ecstatic state in which the boundaries
of subjectivity seem absurdly reductive.
At this point the poem has two options. It could simply conclude with the abstract
restatement ofthis level of collective identification that section four provides, or it could
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change the level of questioning so that the subjective locus of sympathy no longer suffices to
gather all the relevant energies. Obviously \\J'hitman takes the second option, but in astrange
and strained manner which then makes the dialectical ambition seem all the more necessary
because there is at stake here something painful that the poet cannot quite handle. At first the
fifth section tries to maintain an abstract philosophical stance. It posits the question "what is
then between us," so that Whitman can no longer be content to flesh out identifications--he has
to interpret what makes them possible. But the best he can do in this metaphysical mode is use
the questioning to force attention back on the body, on the most material and intimate grounds
for mutual knowledge. That soon appears a dead end: this metaphysicalizing dodges more
than it captures, and the body gets reduced to a screen on which aIien forces leave signs of
their working.
Therefore the poet has to shift to psychological inquiry into what seems a common
locus of pain and mystery linking the poet to his interlocutors. And having eluded all the
positive litanies, the question requires a very different, darker mode of introspection, with its
promise of new fonns of intimate connection:
It is not upon you alone the dark patches fall,
The dark threw its patches down upon me also,
The best I bad done seem'd to me blank and suspicious, ...
Nor is it you alone who know what it is to be evil,
1 am he who knew what it was to be evil,
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I too knitted the old knot of contrariety,
Blabb'd, blush'd, resented, lied, stole, grudg'd ... (162-3)
This is not great poetry. Whitman wants us to believe in this dark bond even though, or
perhaps because, he cannot adequately characterize it. But this section does prepare the way
for great poetry by allowing Whitman first to claim a deeper level of intimacy than even the
ecstatic could provide, then to return to the landscape in ways that charge all the material
details with an astonishing affective lucidity enabling the scene to seem at once fundamentally
material and profoundly spiritual in its aura of articulate yet unspeakable extensions of spirit.
After section seven's simple opening, "Closer ye.t I approach you," the opening of section eight
provides the full Whitmanian orchestra:
Ab, what can ever be more stately and admirable to me than mast-hemm'd
Manhattan?
River and sunset and scaIlop-edg'd waves offlood tide?
The sea-gulls oscillating their bodies, the hay boat in the twilight, and the
belated lighter?
\Vhat gods can exceed these that clasp me by hand, and with voices I love
call me promptly and loudly by my nighest name as I approach?
What is more subtle than this which ties me to the woman or man that looks
into my face?
\Vhich fuses me into you now, and pours my meaning into you?
We understand then do we not?
What I promised without mentioning have you not accepted?
What the study could not teach--what the preaching could not accomplish
is accomplish' d, is it not? (163-4)
The risk here is enormous. The poem teIls us that we understand, but it cannot tell us
what we understand. That it has to show uso And it has to convince us not only that we
understand but that we understand understanding in such a way that we are satisfied with this
mode of human connection. If Whitman succeeds, he does so because of two dialectical
features of this passage. The first is what he does with spectacle. After many catalogues here
we are asked simply to look at an unfolding scene, not to dart our attention every which way.
Then what we see does not follow the traditional way of religious or political spectacle. There
is no reaching out to symbol or back to some authority made visible by the mode of





has to make sense ofthe gods who come to take him by the hand--not so that he can interpret
the scene but so that he will let it unfold in all its fusing power.
So we see meaning born that we cannot grasp intelIectuaIly, yet we feel ourselves
expanding under the influence of the sense of potential for meaning that seems to pervade the
situation. Second, the modeof questioning manages to be so insistentIy and fluidIy self-
reflexive that the movement from question to question takes the place of any answer. In effect
we are asked to agree that a fusion has taken pIace charging both the "I" and the "you" with a
shared sense ofunderstanding what is going on in the scene. The questions suffice to unpack
the celebratory "we understand." We only know what we understand by coming to agree that
we cannot interpret the understanding or restate it. We understand mutual understanding as a
~;llingness to let the questions satisfy because ofhow they lead us back to and summarize
what made the fusion possible. Because meaning is distinguished from efforts to thematize,
this poem in effect builds the force of anti-spectacle directly into ~'hat it so spectacularly
makes materially present.
Section 8 ends on a strange temporal note. The question about what gets
accomplished literally refers to the past but spiritually opens allsorts of possibilities for futures
that rnight emerge from this relation between understanding and acceptance. Section nine
brilliantly fulfills that promise in surprising ways. It runs through a list of imperatives that
beggars \Vordsworth's \l/ays ofbuilding poems so that they culminate in acts ofwill:
Flow on, river! flow with the flood-tide and ebb with the ebb-tide!
Frolic on, crested and scallop-edg'd waves! ...
Throb, baffied and curious brain! throw out questions and answers!
Suspend here and everywhere, eternal float of solution! ...
Sound out, voices ofyoung men! loudly and musically call me by my nighest
name!
Live, old life! play that part that looks back on the actor or actress!
Play the old role, the role that is great or small according as one makes it! (164)
The stakes in rivalling Wordsworth are high here. The unspoken understanding
celebrated at the end of section eight cannot quite suffice for Whitmanian citizenship, no
matter how rich. Understanding must elicit acts ofwill, and those acts must create another
level ofbonding that can in turn take the form of a higher understanding yet--in this case an
articulable understanding ofwhat it really means to attach soul to those faces and to the
Whitmanian way of letting those faces be. But to appreciate ful1y the role that will plays here
one has to go back to the pressure on it that emerged in the neediness explored by section six.
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The contrast enables us to realize that now the process of return allows consciousness to
reinhabit both the wording ofthat need (in the figure of"nighest name") and the overall feeling
of distance fro~ all those who seemed merely to be playing parts~
Landscape once again becomes the spectacular grounding for the depth of affirmative
feeling now able to transform the earlier pain.. Here the scene can embody the very intensity of
will that it elicits, as ifboth nature and society at their most ecstatic became single collective .
bodies:
Receive the summer sky, you water, and faithfully hold it tiIl all downcast eyes
have time to take it from you!
Diverge, fine spokes of light, from the shape of my head, or any son' s head in
the surrIit water! (165)
Place becomes so charged with significance that the intensities open into a distinctively
psychological space that is for Whitman also a vital site for sociaI consciousness--not one
characterized by specific agendas but only by a sense of involvement in the need to develop
agendas. Landscape becomes inseparaqle from the range of"you"s who inhabit it. And that
habitation is not abstract; it consists in the enactment of differences allowing the manifestation
of souls the same materiality and presence as the landscape possesses. Poetry complements the
visual spectacle by embodying a single readerly consciousness giving the various differences
within the scene a shareable substance in a pure present tense:
We use you and do not cast you aside--we plant you permanently within us,
We fathom you not--we love you--there is perfection in you also,
You furnish your parts towards eternity,
Great or smalI, you furnish your parts towards the soul. (165)
I do not think it a denial ofWhitman's commitments to see this poem, and much of
Whitman's social poetry, as capable of surving the exceptionalism on which it was founded.
Whether or not that exceptionalism was justified in the mid-nineteenth century, before the
cultural forces took hold that led Whitman to the despondency of his Democratic Vistas, it
clearly cannot now suffice as a model for America's roles in international politics. Yet there
may be a Whitmanian way in which aversion ofthat exceptionalism remains important for our
increasingly post-national world. For if America was and is exceptional, it was and is so only
because it bases political values on a very specific figure ofthe legislative subject: the US
subject, or, better, the US subject position can be characterized as a particular perspective on
the legislative power characterizing subjectivity. The US democratic subject cannot be
':,. I
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reduced to a set of rights emerging \Vithin history. 1t is at once too concrete and too abstract
to be derived from history, so that it requires as its fundamental formulation ihe elemental
abstraction provided by.the Constitution. Such subjectivity is in large part a construct--not
because it has no actual referent but because the referent is so common and therefore difficult
to value that we need the construct as our way of focussing attention on its specific attributes.
And so decoupled from history, this mode of subjectivity remains available to all who make the
appropriate identifications. Through such identifications agents not only see, they also feel
how what makes us different also makes us fundamentally the same. This exceptionalist
version of US citizenship then manages to be the one form of nationaIism that logically leads
beyond nationalism to more expansive identifications \Vith any political unit that can espouse
commitments to that universal legislative subject position.
I can elose by offering abrief example of how a Whitmanian perspective might make a
practical political difference. During recent diseussions of ethnicity in America there has been
a great deal of interest in accepting the slogan that the US has "a comrnon culture \\-"hich is
multicultural" (New National C~ture, '173).11 Indeed it is hard not to want to accept that
formulation af American exceptionalism. But there is far too much ambiguity in the phrase
"common culture" to allow one to feel at ease in yielding to that desire. \Vhitman can help us
both analyze the problem and develop a \tision of commonness that \\-;11 bear a good deal more
intensity ofv.ill than we can get from this bureacratically seductive formula. Whitman's dualist
psychology calls attention to an immense gulfbetween the descriptive implications of
"common culture which is multi-cultural" and the ideal, affective implications of the term. I
take the first, descriptive assertion to be obviously true--there are a lot of cultures within the
USo But the descriptive assertion is useless unless one can move easily from the description to
an evaluation by which one actually identifies with that commonness.Only then would be able
to seeure the force that the slogan seeks--that one takes an affinnation of that multi-
culturalism as fundamental to what it means to assurne the identity of US citizen.
Yet in much of the US there is no identification with this ideal dimension. Because it
does not fully recognize the dual meanings or the depth af refusal of the ideal one, the report' s
slogan seems hollow, seems an eifort to evade anx.iety rather than to confront real tensions.
Whitman cannat resolve those tensions. But he can call our attention to what might lead us
not only to recognize the tensions even with the phrase "common" but also to find a path by
which the two meanings might be linked. Whitmanian dialectic is a process of finding within
the descriptian of the common fact of a multicultural society what might ground our also
coming to feel and to will the forms of human solidarity that might make it possible for us to
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cultivate those differences. Were \Vhitman really read as a national poet, the commission might
have realized that our common"culture is not multi-culturalism per se but the shared ideal of
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My Pai11terly Abstractio11 in Moder1list America11 Poetry provides the background for this
claim. Now I add that while critics all acknowledge the modernist poets' interest in Whitman,
they are prone to share Pound's insistence that for the modems it had become a time for
carving. Consequently critics ignore how much of achallenge the modernists feIt from the
version of subjective agency that Whitman could establish as a representative "I" but that for
them could only be constructed by relying on the transpersonal qualities of their medium. In
support ofthis claim I have written an essay on W.C. Williams, "The Local, the National, and
the Transnational in Williams' Poetry."
2 Whitman's fullest statements ofhis ambitions take place in his "Backward Glance over
Travel'd Roads," especially in Leaves ofGrass, pp. 572-4. At the 1988 EAAS conference
Shira Wolowosky's "Walt Whitman: the Poet as President" gave a superb historical account
ofwhat representation meant to Whitman as a political thinker. And
Ed Folsom, Walt Whitman 's Native Represe11tations offers a compelling historical account of
ho\v Whitman went about producing that representativeness. Folsom also has a strong sense
that I w~nt to build upon of Whitman understanding his various arenas of concern as important
not simply because of what they alIo\ved him to say but because of the stances they allowed the
VY·riting to 'elaborate (176-7).
3 The one derriocratic stance now acceptable to "advanced criticism" is the role of
cosmopolite, since that role enables one to accept the play of differences while resisting any
specific national authority in the name of more general ideals of civilization and cultivation.
But this distance from the nation exacts a substantial cost. Because the cosmopolite identifies
only \vith an ideal, an ideal with no concrete embodiment, it may ultimately oifer little more
than a public version of the liberal ironist who has to substitute distanced acknowledgement for
particular commitments. Cosmopolites like Edward Said base their values on fundamental
intellectual traditions, but they cannot explain VY·hy the society should honor these free
intellectuals since their values do not require sacrifices to the nation whose resources they need
in order to sustain their post-national fealties.
4 These last t\VO sentences echo first Philip Schlesinger, "Europeanness: A New Political
Battlefield," p. 321, and Walker Connor, "A Nation is a Nation, is aState, is an Ethnic Group,
... ," p. 36.
s Critics like Berleant who distrust all abstract aspects of collective identity may in fact be
playing out one pervasive American identity, the Huck Finn syndrome that celebrates as the
good life the freedom to cut most ofthe abstract ties binding agents to the social order. For an
excellent critique of what he calls "cultural radicalism" that is based on its continuing
absorption in American individualism see Winfried Fluck, "Literature, Liberalism, and the
Current Cultural Radicalism."
6 One can make the same point less melodramatically by calling attention to the fact that
social scientists have long been fascinated by certain public acts like voting and even paying
taxes fairly because there is no rational interest story that will explain why we do so. But
perhaps we do so largely because ofthe opportunity such occasions give us to accept identities
within which there is acknowledgment of our dependencies along with the simultaneous
affirmation that we want to identify with others to whom we are bound by those shared
dependencies.
7 For an interesting historical example ofthe song "America the Beautiful used as both a
symbolof the US' s social failures and of the still invokable ideals that might bring relief from
those failures see Robert James Branham, '''OfThee I Sing': Contesting America."
8 There is an important corrollary to this sense ofhaving a nation to address. For then one
can begin to use private psychology as itself affected by the national identifications and hence
use shame as a public weapon. One might even argue that without the sense of shame at being




principles, the war might still be going on, since the government had found ways to restrict
casualties to mostly minority soldiers.
9 Whitman's perfectionism has much in cornmon with the Emersonian one developed by
Stanley Cavell in Conditions Handsome and Un~andsome. But Whitman is distinctive in
stressing the basic structure of perfectionist self-surpassing while not worrying much about
rhetorics for representing specific ideals of perfection.
10 "0 I say these are not the parts and poems ofthe body only, but of the soul,
o I say now these are the soul" ("A Woman Waits for Me")
11 I take this slogan from Frederic Buell's carefully reasoned critique of exceptionalist melting-
pot versions of US history in his Natiol1al Culture and the New Global System, where he cites
~ report by the New York State Social Studies Review and Development Committee "One
Nation, Many Peoples: a Declaration of Cultural Interdependence."
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